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I. INTRODUCTION

Throughout its history of decisions concerning product liability, West
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Virginia has consistently been a forward-looking jurisdiction, chiefly concerned
with best protecting its residential consumers. Accordingly, the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals has rendered a number of product liability decisions
premised on two underlying concerns. First, the court has consistently adopted
rules and policies liberal to a plaintiff's recovery.' Second, the court recognizes that
product liability is a tort concept and must be developed within the guidelines of
tort terminology.2 Therefore, West Virginia will consistently adopt rules most
favorable to a plaintiff's recovery provided that these rules are consistent with the
governing principles of tort law.
Even at the earliest stages of development of product liability law in West
Virginia, the courts have taken a liberal stance. Accordingly, in Morningstar v.
Black & Decker Mfg. Co., Justice Miller stated that "it is apparent that while we
have not been in the vanguard of the movement, neither have we languished in the
rear." 3 Indeed, from its earliest decisions in the area of product liability the court
has held that privity of contract was never a bar to tort recovery against a
manufacturer in West Virginia.' In Webb v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co.,
West Virginia became one of the earliest jurisdictions to allow the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur to establish negligence against a manufacturer.' Webb effectively
"permitted proof of the defect along with its being the proximate cause of the
injury as a sufficient factual basis for recovery."' In fact, res ipsa loquiturperforms
a function similar to strict liability by "allowing deserving plaintiffs to succeed
notwithstanding what would otherwise be difficult or insuperable problems of
proof."7
1

See generally Blankenship v. General Motors Corp., 406 S.E.2d 781 (W. Va. 1991); King v.

Kayak Mfg. Corp., 387 S.E.2d 511 (W. Va. 1989); Ilosky v. Michelin Tire Corp., 307 S.E.2d 603 (IV. Va.
1983); Star Furniture Co. v. Pulaski Furniture Co., 297 S.E.2d 854 (W. Va. 1982); Morningstar v. Black &
Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 666 (W. Va. 1979).
2

See generally Morningstar,253 S.E.2d at 682 (holding that what constitutes a defective product

must be analyzed in traditional tort terminology). See also Star FurnitureCo., 297 S.E.2d at 859 (unwilling
to extend strict liability to mere loss in value cases holding that reduction in value merely because of a
product flaw is outside the scope of tort law).
Morningstar,253 S.E.2d at 680.
See Peters v. Johnson, Jackson & Co., 41 S.E. 190 (W. Va. 1902) (effectively discounting the
privity rule of Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842) and anticipating by
some fourteen years the seminal decision to abolish privity of contract found in MacPhersonv. Buick Motor
Co., 111 N. E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916)).
4

See Webb v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 2 S.E.2d 898 (W. Va. 1939); see also Ferrell v.
Royal Crown Bottling Co., 109 S.E.2d 489 (W. Va. 1959) (using res ipsa loquitur to hold a manufacturerbottler liable in tort for injuries to a store patron resulting from the explosion of a soft drink bottle).
5

6

Morningstar,253 S.E.2d at 680.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY §2, comment a at 15 (1997).
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Although the principles and decisions on product liability in West Virginia
have existed for decades, West Virginia might soon be faced with a decision that
could radically alter the existing law on product liability. On May 20, 1997, the
American Law Institute (ALl) officially adopted the new Restatement Third, Torts:
Products Liability. This Restatement is an attempt to revise Section 402A of the
ALI's Restatement of Torts, 2d, a cornerstone in the field of product liability law
for the last three decades. With the ALI's adoption of this new Restatement, courts
in West Virginia will, no doubt, soon be asked to recognize and adopt this
Restatement as the governing principle on product liability. However, the West
Virginia courts should refrain from adopting this Restatement because it is contrary
to the established precedent and policy of this state.
The new Restatement of Products Liability contains a number of changes
to the existing law on product liability. The new Restatement abolishes Section
402A for all design defect cases; abolishes the consumer expectation test as a
standard of defectiveness, except in food product cases; abolishes negligence and
implied warranty as a separate basis for recovery and allows only one claim to go
to the jury; requires proof of a reasonable alternative design in most design defect
cases; and creates a negligence test for product warning cases."
The Restatement presents at least two gross departures from established
precedent in West Virginia. First, the Restatement generally provides that sellers
and distributors of defective products are subject to liability only for harm caused
by product "defects," thus, effectively abolishing causes of action against sellers
and distributors based in negligence and warranty.' Under the new Restatement,
there would be only one form of product liability action. Regardless of whether it is
labeled strict liability, warranty, or negligence, only one claim could go to the jury.
The second and more radical departure from West Virginia's current laws
on product liability is found in Section 2(b) of the new Restatement. This section
provides the absolute requirement that before an injured party can recover from a
manufacturer or seller of a defectively designed product that has caused the injury,
the plaintiff must prove that the product could have been designed in some manner
that would have avoided the injury.' Thus, this section requires a consumer to
prove a reasonable alternative design (RAD) in all design defect cases, regardless
of how dangerous a product might be, before the product's manufacturer can be
held liable.1'
This comments addresses the new Restatement's departures from current
West Virginia product liability law. The new Restatement's view goes against the
8

See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY (1997).

9

Id. at§ I.

10

See id. at § 2(b).

11

See id.
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West Virginia courts' policy of adopting liberal rules for a plaintiffs recovery in
product liability. 2 Since the new Restatement departs from established policy and
precedent in West Virginia, the West Virginia courts should refrain from adopting
the new Restatement's view on product liability.
II. THE RESTATEMENT'S ABOLITION OF SEPARATE BASES FOR RECOVERY

Section 1 of the new Restatement effectively abolishes the right of a
plaintiff to present multiple theories of recovery to a jury.13 Because of the
Reporter's insistence on liability only for product defects, causes of action
premised on negligence and implied warranty theories are basically eliminated.
Therefore, only one claim can go to a jury. The rationale for this limitation is that
the claims, whether premised on a theory of negligence, implied warranty, and/or
strict liability, are factually identical. However, this view does not consider the
"conceptual differences between such claims. [For instance], negligence claims
focus on the conduct of the defendant; implied warranty claims on the fitness of the
product; and strict liability claims on the safety of the design." 14
Section 1 of the new Restatement represents a significant departure from
the law in West Virginia. West Virginia allows a product liability action to be
brought under three independent theories -- strict liability, negligence, and warranty
- and permits a jury instruction on each of these causes of action supported by
evidence.15 In State v. Hall, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals first
entitled a plaintiff to a jury instruction on each cause of action brought that was
supported by sufficient evidence. 6 In Ilosky v. Michelin Tire Corp., the court
extended this policy to the realm of product liability just four years after
Morningstarwas decided. 7

Ilosky involved an action brought against a tire distributor for injuries
sustained by the plaintiff in an automobile accident."8 The appellee alleged multiple
12

See supra note 1.

13

Section 1 of the Restatement Third, Torts: Products Liability provides the following "[o]ne

engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing products who sells or distributes a defective
product is subject to liability for harm to persons or property caused by the product defect." RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OFTORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § I (1997).
14

Larry S. Stewart, A New Frontier: Design Defect Cases and the New Restatement, TRIAL,

Products Liability, 21-26 (Nov. 1988).
is

See Ilosky v. Michelin Tire Corp., 307 S.E.2d 603, 613 (W. Va. 1983).

16

See State v. Hall, 298 S.E.2d 246, 255 (W. Va. 1982).

17

See Ilosky, 307 S.E.2d at 613.

Is

See id. at 607.
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theories of recovery including strict liability and negligence on the part of the tire
distributor.' 9 The appellant argued that the trial court erred by not granting its
motion to force the appellee to choose only one theory for the jury to consider."0 In
upholding the trial court's denial of the appellant's motion, the Supreme Court of
Appeals held that
[e]ach theory contains different elements which plaintiffs must
prove... to recover. No rational reason exists to require plaintiffs
in product liability actions to elect which theory to submit to the
jury after the evidence has been presented when they may elect to
bring suit on one or all of the theories.... To permit plaintiffs to
plead alternative causes of action, but to force them to choose one
theory to submit to the jury after the taking of evidence would
force some plaintiffs to forego the strict liability cause of action if
they believed they had stronger negligence or warranty cases. We
decline to adopt this view of the law.2
Thus, although no "rational reason" exists for plaintiffs to elect one theory
to submit to a jury, the Restatement asks plaintiffs to do just that, effectively
ignoring the formidable bodies of jurisprudence on negligence and warranty law.
Therefore, Section 1 of the new Restatement represents a significant deviation from
the current law in West Virginia. However, this departure from West Virginia law
is not the grossest departure.
The new Restatement's biggest and most significant deviation .from current
product liability law in West Virginia is the reasonable alternative design
requirement (RAD), necessary to prove a product defect and recover under a
product liability cause of action. Before delving into the RAD requirement, it is
first necessary to lay out the history and principles of the doctrine of strict liability
as they exist in West Virginia.
Il. WEST VIRGINIA'S LAW OF STRICT LIABILITY IN TORT
A.

The UnderlyingPolicies Behind West Virginia'sRule ofStrict Liability

The overwhelming and primary reason for adopting strict liability both
nationally and in West Virginia was to relieve the consumer from the burden of

19

See id.

20

See id. at 608.

21

Id. at 613.
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proving negligence.' To recover under the current West Virginia theory of strict
liability, a plaintiff need only show that the product was defective and that the
defect was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury.23 The basic premise behind

West Virginia's strict liability law is "to insure that the costs of injuries resulting
from defective products are borne by the manufacturer that put such products on
the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect
themselves." 2" This rationale is based on a risk distribution theory, recognized in
West Virginia as the idea that "manufacturers may spread the cost of compensating
such injuries to society by including the cost of insurance or judgments as part of a
product's price tag."' Therefore, the key component under the doctrine of strict
liability is to "remove the burden from the plaintiff of establishing in what manner
the manufacturer was negligent in making the product." ' An additional reason for
strict liability is that it enables a plaintiff to avoid some of the defenses to warranty
actions."
B.

Morningstar and the Origins of the Strict Liability Doctrine in West
Virginia

The West Virginia rule of strict liability was first pronounced by the court
in Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co.. In Morningstar, the court adopted
West Virginia's current rule on strict liability holding that "[a] manufacturer is
strictly liable in tort when an article he [or she] places on the market, knowing that
it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes
injury to a human being." 28 In adopting this rule, West Virginia chose to follow the
decision and standard first enunciated by the Supreme Court of California in
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc..29 In so doing, West Virginia explicitly
declined to adopt the Section 402A of the Restatement of Torts, 2d position on

22

See Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 666, 682 (W. Va. 1979).

23

See id. at 680.

24

Star Furniture Co. v. Pulaski Furniture Co., 297 S.E.2d 854, 856 (W. Va. 1982)(quoting Greenman

v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963)).
25

Star Furniture,297 S.E.2d at 856.

26

Morningstar,253 S.E.2d at 680.

27

See Star Furniture, 297 S.E.2d at 857. These defenses include notice of breach of warranty,

disclaimers of liability, and privity. See id.
25

Morningstar,253 S.E.2d at 677 (quoting Greenman, 377 P.2d at 900).

29

See Greenman,377 P.2d at 900.
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strict liability." The Restatement of Torts, 2d contained a requirement that a
defective product must be "unreasonably dangerous" to recover under strict
liability."' The Greenman Court rejected this requirement because it injected "a
concept of foreseeability into the tort product liability law which is inappropriate,
since the manufacturer's liability is not based on negligence and the issue of
foreseeability is a part of negligence law."' Accordingly, feeling that the
Greenman rule was more appropriate to alleviate consumers of the burden of
proving negligence, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, in Morningstar,
chose to adopt it as the strict liability standard in West Virginia.'
The Morningstar Court recognized that products liability cases require a
case-by-case analysis.' Nevertheless, the court provided a general outline to be
followed with regard to strict liability analysis.' The court said, "the cause of
action rests in tort, and . . . the initial inquiry, in order to fix liability on the

manufacturer, focuses on the nature of the defect and whether the defect was the
proximate cause of [the] plaintiff's injury."' To this end, West Virginia recognizes
three broad, non-mutually exclusive categories of defective products.37 These
include design defectiveness and structural defectiveness, both of which involve the
"physical condition of the product which renders it unsafe when

.

.. used in a

'
manner." 38

The third category involves defectiveness arising
reasonably intended
out of a lack of, or the inadequacy of, warnings, instructions, and labels.39 This
category is often referred to as "failure to warn." 40
C.

Further Developments on Strict Liability in West Virginia Following

30

"One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or

consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or
consumer, or to his property...." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
31

Id.

32

Morningstar,253 S.E.2d at 680.

33

See id.

4

See id. at 682.

35

See id.

36

Id.

37

See Morningstar,253 S.E.2d at 682.

30

Id.

39

See id. at 680.

40

Johnson by Johnson v. General Motors Corp., 438 S.E.2d 28,36 (W. Va. 1993).
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Morningstar
Although there have not been a great number of decisions in West Virginia
on product liability since Morningstar, the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals continues to render decisions and adopt doctrines favorable to a plaintiff's
recovery, so long as these principles are developed in the context of tort principles.
Thus, West Virginia recognizes strict liability to recover for property damage,"
circumstantial evidence to prove a "defect," 42 and a second collision theory of
recovery for automobile accidents."
1.

Strict Liability to Recover for Property Damage

Some three years after Morningstar, the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals decided Star Furniture Co. v. Pulaski Furniture Co. and allowed strict
liability to be used to recover for property damage to defective products in the
absence of personal injury, provided that the damage resulted from a "sudden
calamitous" event." By declining to follow the extreme liberal position (imposing
product liability on a manufacturer for any damage to a product), as well as the
extreme conservative position (rejecting any product liability for damage to the
product itself), the court has taken an intermediate position conceming strict
liability recovery for property damage." The Star FurnitureCourt declined to adopt
the extreme liberal position because, in those instances where a defect in a product
creates a mere reduction in the value of the product, as opposed to significant
physical harm to the product, the court recognized that the proper remedy lies with
contract law.' Thus, recognizing the general boundaries of tort and contract theory,
West Virginia permits recovery under a strict liability cause of action for property
damage to products resulting from a sudden calamitous event." Damages that result
because of a "bad bargain" fall outside the scope of strict liability.4 8
41

See Star Furniture Co. v. Pulaski Furniture Co., 297 S.E.2d 854, 857 (W. Va. 1982).

42

Anderson v. Chrysler Corp., 403 S.E.2d 189, 193 (W. Va. 1991).

43

See Johnson by Johnson, 438 S.E.2d at 33.

44

Star Furniture,297 S.E.2d at 859.

45

See id. at 858-59.

46

See id. at 859.

See id. "Tort law traditionally has been concerned with compensating for physical injury
to
person or property. Contract law has been concerned with the promises parties place upon themselves by
mutual obligation." Id.
47

Id. In CapitolFuels, Inc. v. Clark Equipment Co., 382 S.E.2d 311 (W. Va. 1989) the Supreme
Court of Appeals stated

48
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2.

Circumstantial Evidence to Prove a Defect

Another doctrine of strict liability that is favorable to plaintiffs concerns
the use of circumstantial evidence. In West Virginia, the courts let plaintiffs present
circumstantial evidence to make a strict liability case. 9 In Anderson v. Chrysler
Corp., where a buyer's strict liability action was granted against an auto
manufacturer to recover for loss sustained when an automobile caught fire, the
court held that direct evidence was not necessary to make out aprimafaciecase."
Instead the court permitted
circumstantial evidence [to be used] to make out a prima facie
case in a strict liability action, even though the precise nature of
the defect cannot be identified, so long as the evidence shows that
a malfunction in the product occurred that would not ordinarily
happen in the absence of a defect."'
By allowing a plaintiff to establish aprimafaciecase of strict liability with
circumstantial evidence, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals adopted
another rule that is beneficial for a plaintiff's recovery.
3.

The Crashworthiness Doctrine

Finally, the adoption of the crashworthiness doctrine represents a paradigm
to the idea that West Virginia adopts policies liberal to a plaintiffs recovery. First
recognized in West Virginia in Blankenship v. General Motors Corp."z, the
crashworthiness doctrine is complex and involves two collisions.53 In adopting the
under the "bad bargain" concept, the fact that the product may be flawed or defective,

such that it does not meet the purchaser's expectations or is even unusable because of
the defect, does not mean that he may recover the value of the product under a strict

liability in tort theory.
Id. at313.
49

See Anderson v. Chrysler Corp., 403 S.E.2d 189, 193 (W. Va. 1991).

so

See Id.

51

Id. at 194.

52

406 S.E.2d 781 (W.Va. 1991).

53

The concept of the crashworthiness doctrine is as follows:
In the first phase of the accident, the plaintiff's automobile collides with -another
automobile or with a stationary object. Most of the property damage results from the
first collision, but the occupants of the vehicle usually sustain little or no injury at this
stage. Personal injuries occur most frequently in the second collision, in which the
occupants are thrown against or collide with some part of their automobile. A
manufacturer is liable for the plaintiff's loss in the second collision only if the defective
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crashworthiness doctrine, the Blankenship Court chose to follow the more liberal
rule that a plaintiff need show only that a defect was a factor in causing some
aspect of the plaintiffs harm."4 "Once a plaintiff has made ... [a] primafacie

showing, the manufacturer can then limit its liability if it can show that the
plaintiff's injuries are capable of apportionment between the first and second
collisions.""5 This rule places the burden of allocating the injuries on the
manufacturer.'
In contrast, the more conservative standard requires the plaintiff to "prove
that the product defect was the cause of a particular enhanced or aggravated injury
that [the] plaintiff suffered." 5 Under this standard, first, a plaintiff must offer proof
of an alternative safer product design to establish that the product in question was
defective. 5 Second, the plaintiff must prove what injuries would have resulted had
the alternative design been used. 9 Third, and finally, the plaintiff must offer a
method of establishing the extent of enhanced injuries attributable to the defective
design."
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals flatly rejected the
conservative standard in Blankenship stating that "West Virginians are not going to
pay product liability insurance premiums so that all the residents of the 10th
Circuit, where Fox v. Ford Motor Co. was decided, can collect the benefits." 1
Recognizing that West Virginians are already paying the costs of insurance and
judgments each time they purchase a General Motors automobile, the court went on
to hold that "in any crashworthiness case where there is a split of authority on any
issue .... we adopt the rule that is most liberal to the plaintiff."'6 2
design of the automobile caused or exacerbated the injury.
Note, Apportionment of Damages in the "Second Collision" Case, 63 VA. L. REv. 475, 476 (1977).
54

See Blankenship, 406 S.E.2d at 786.

55

Id.

56

See id.

57

Id. at 785; see also Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 737-38 (3d Cir. 1976).

58

See Huddell, 537 S.E.2d at 737.

59

See id.

60

See id. at 738.

61

Blankenship,406 S.E.2d at 786.

62

Id. Indeed, Justice Neely rationalized this decision by saying that "for a tiny state incapable of

controlling the direction of the national law in terms of appropriate trade-offs among employment, research,
development, and compensation for the injured users of products, the adoption of rules liberal to plaintiffs is
simple self-defense." Id.
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Based on the court's adoption of strict liability doctrines, West Virginia
follows concepts and policies that best aid the plaintiff in bringing a cause of action
premised on strict liability, so long as these policies are within the realm of tort
principle. The new Restatement is at odds with this policy because of the
substantial hurdles the RAD requirement presents to the consumer/plaintiff.
IV. THE NEW RESTATEMENT OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND ITS DEVIATIONS FROM
WEST VIRGINIA'S STANDARDS ON STRICT LIABILITY

A.

Section 2 of the Restatement ofProductsLiability

The most significant proposed change in the law of products liability
involves Section 2 of the Restatement."3 This section establishes the standards for
manufacturing defects, design defects, and inadequate wamings-the traditional
defect categories present in West Virginia.' Section 2(a) of the Restatement
concerning manufacturing defects retains strict liability for these types of defects'
Thus, if the product departs form its intended design and causes harm, the
manufacturer is liable even though all possible care was exercised in the
preparation and marketing of the product. This is consistent with West Virginia
law. However, Section 2(b) of the new Restatement is truly at odds with West
Virginia law.
B.

Section 2(b) of the New Restatement and its Conflicts with West Virginia
Law

Section 2(b) of the new Restatement represents the most extreme change to
the law on products liability and the greatest potential obstacle to a consumer's
right to recovery for injuries from a defectively designed product. Section 2(b)
defines design defect as existing when the risk of reasonable harm posed by the
product might have been reduced or avoided by employing a "reasonable
alternative design (RAD)," and the failure to utilize that design makes the product
not reasonably safe.' Under the new Restatement position, for a plaintiff to
Specifically the Section 2(b) requirement that to prove liability for a design defect, one must show
63
that there existed a reasonable alternative design (RAD) to the manufacturer's design that is claimed to have
caused the injury. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(b) (1997).
West Virginia categorizes these defects as structural defectiveness, design defectiveness, and use
defectiveness respectively. See Momingstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 666, 682 (W. Va.
1979).

64

65

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY

6

Id. at § 2(b).
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successfully litigate an action under strict liability, that plaintiff must prove that a
technologically feasible and practical RAD existed at the time of the manufacture
of the product and that the defendant failed to employ it." This RAD requirement is
at odds with West Virginia's law on product liability in several respects. First, the
Reporter's insist on the use of a risk-utility standard to measure design defects.
This is not the standard set forth by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.
The RAD requirement also seriously conflicts with Daubert as interpreted in West
Virginia. Finally, overshadowing these other deviations, the RAD requirement
presents significant hurdles to a plaintiffs recovery - effectively discouraging a
plaintiff from bringing a product liability cause of action.
1.

Hurdles Involved with the RAD Requirement

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the RAD requirement is a product
liability standard in a majority of American courts (as claimed by the Reporters) 8 ,
it still creates a major barrier to the ability of consumers injured by defective
products to recover from the manufacturers and sellers of products. As Professor
Vandall points out, "the reasonable alternative design provision.., contravenes the
foundational policies of products liability law ...

in many important respects." 9

The RAD requirement places the burden of knowledge on the plaintiff and ignores
the fact that many of today's products are complex and beyond the understanding
of the average consumer.7 By increasing the expense of bringing suit, the RAD
requirement also seriously impacts the economics of consumer litigation because
the loss is shifted more toward the consumer.7 This runs contrary to the idea that
the loss should fall with the manufacturer because the manufacturer can build a
safer product or obtain insurance.72 Additionally, shifting loss to the consumer

67

See id.

68

It is worth noting that this is a rather large assumption. Indeed the representative character of this

Restatement has been criticized by a number of scholars. See Frank J. Vandall, The Restatement (Third) of
Torts: ProductsLiability Section 2(b): The Reasonable Alternative Design Requirement, 61 TENN. L. REv.
1407, 1409 (1994) (concluding that "the majority of jurisdictions do not make reasonable alternative design
an element of the plaintiff's prima facie case"); John Vargo, The Emperor's New Clothes: The American
Law Institute Adorns a "New Cloth "for Section 402A Products Liability Design Defects-A Survey of the
States Reveals a Different Weave, 26 U. MEM. L. REv. 493, 536 (1996) (summarizing results and reviewing
the law of design defect, state by state, in categories of case law, statutes and pattern jury instructions).
69

Vandall, supranote 68, at 1423.

70

See id.

71

See id

72

See id.
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assumes that the consumer is as well insured as the seller, which is rarely true.73
Another problem with the RAD requirement is that it violates the basic premise
behind strict liability, namely to allow a plaintiff to avoid the higher hurdle of
proving negligence.7' In fact, this requirement places an arguably higher hurdle on
the plaintiff than does the negligence standard.75 Moreover, the RAD requirement
"violates the policy that, since a manufacturer causes a product to be purchased
through skillful advertising and marketing, it should bear the losses inherent in
selling a dangerous product."76
a. The Danger Lies in the Details
The full impact of Section 2(b) can only be discerned from a reading of the
Section comments. A fair reading of those comments reveals that a case based on a
faulty design will not reach the jury without a "design expert" with a "redesign"
of the product.' Furthermore, in some cases, a "design expert" might not be
enough. Although the Restatement does not require a plaintiff to produce a
prototype, a plaintiff must convince a jury that the alternative design is the better
design in order to prevail at trial.78 This involves a consideration of a number of
factors stated in the Restatement." These include the effects of the design on
"production costs, product longevity, maintenance and repair, esthetics, and
marketability."" Furthermore, the Restatement also requires that the design be
"technologically feasible and practical," 81 a burden that is placed on the plaintiff.
73

See id.

74

See Vandall, supranote 68, at 1424.

75

See id.

78

Id.

The reporters point out that Section 2(b) does not require a plaintiff to produce expert testimony in
every case. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUcTs LIABILITY §2, commentf at 23 (1997). For
instance, in those cases where the "feasibility of a reasonable alternative design is obvious and understandable
to laypersons and therefore expert testimony is unnecessary to support a finding that the product should have
been designed differently and more safely." Id. However, cases of this nature are rare and do not represent a
typical product liability action. Thus, for all practical purposes, an expert is needed when dealing with most
product liability actions. In fact the Supreme Court of Connecticut has held that "such a rule would require
plaintiffs to retain an expert witness even in cases in which lay jurors can infer a design defect from
circumstantial evidence." Potter v.Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1332 (Conn. 1997).
77

78

See RFSTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY §2(b) (1997).

79

See id. at § 2, comment fat 23.

80

Id.

81

Id. at 24.
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Thus, the plaintiff must present evidence to prove that the proposed alternative
design is better. Assuming that the plaintiffs evidence would be admissible under
Daubert,the considerations outlined in the Restatement comments will no doubt be
emphasized by counsel for the manufacturer as a means to disqualify an expert who
has not considered all these factors. Also, these considerations can be used to defeat
an otherwise qualified expert if all the facts have not been carefully studied.
RAD presents a number of problems and obstacles to consumer recovery.
First, in cases involving simple products, regardless of how obviously dangerous
they might be, the plaintiff must retain an expert to re-design the product.' This
might be economically practical if dealing with death or serious injury. However, if
the injury is not so serious, the expense involved in a re-design will likely make it
impossible for a reasonable recovery to be had. This same concern is present in
cases dealing with highly complex products. For example, the expense involved in
re-designing an aircraft could be enormous "even though common sense tells one
that the design was defective if a single engine failure could make a three-engine
aircraft practically uncontrollable." 83 Another problem with the RAD is that "if
plaintiffs cannot develop a 'better' IUD, a 'better' breast implant, or 'better'
asbestos, and prove the safety and marketability of the 'better' product, claims
based on what are now recognized as dangerous products will be eliminated."'"
Finally, even in cases involving mass recalls of products, a plaintiff could
theoretically lose because of an inability to create a "better" design. '
b. What the RAD Requirement Means for West Virginia
Consumers
As Professor Shapo points out,
the [Restatement's] formula not only gives away the ball game on
litigation but on design itself. It places not only the business
decision, but also the legal decision about product risk exclusively
with the manufacturer. It simply does not allow anyone to
challenge a product design on the seemingly obvious ground that
the design was, in the general environment in which it was

82

See Bill Wagner, Restatement of the Law Ill--Torts: Products Liability-Restatementor Reform,

REFERENCE MATERIALS, Vol.2, at 1646 (ATLA Annual Convention 1995).
83

Id.

84

Id. at 1647.

85

Id.
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offered, too dangerous.'
The practical effect of these types of scenarios is to discourage plaintiffs
from bringing valid causes of action under the theory of product liability. This is
the very result that the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals sought to avoid in
Ilosky v. Michelin Tire Corp.." Furthermore, in Blankenship v. General Motors
Corp., the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has already rejected one
alternative design component (found in the Huddell crashworthiness standard)."
The court rejected this standard because it was not the national standard. Instead,
the court established a policy in adopting a standard that would be most liberal to a
plaintiff's recovery in all crashworthiness cases." The rationale behind this was one
of" simple self-defense" to West Virginia consumers.'
The RAD requirement is at odds with the above rationales because it is not
a national standard for strict liability and adoption of the RAD requirement would
seriously impair West Virginia's ability to protect its resident consumers. Although
the Reporters of the new Restatement declare that some 28 states have adopted a
RAD requirement and that it represents a majority standard, Professor Vargo's
exhaustive research indicates that only three states have clearly adopted this
requirement under common law."1
Furthermore, due to the substantial burdens to recovery that a plaintiff
must face under the RAD requirement, it would be more difficult for a plaintiff to
recover under or even bring a strict liability cause of action (even in cases where
the product is clearly defective). The plaintiff, as a consumer, is still paying the
costs of liability and insurance (factored into the overall price of the product) to the
manufacturer each time he or she purchases a product. However, this same
consumer, if RAD is adopted, may be unable to collect for injuries suffered from a
defective product. As a result, West Virginians would essentially be paying product
liability insurance premiums so that residents of states where proof of a RAD is not
U

Marshall S. Shapo, ALI Legislation as a Consumer Product: Should Courts Buy the Proposed

Restatement of Products Liability?, in POSSIBLE STATE COURT RESPONSES TO THE ALI'S PROPOSED

RESTATEMENT OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 13, 15 (Roscoe Pound Foundation ed. 1997).
87

See llosky v. Michelin Tire Corp., 307 S.E.2d 603, 613 (W. Va. 1983) (refusing to require a

plaintiff to present only one theory of recovery to a jury based on the premise that some plaintiff's would
forego strict liability actions if they believed they had stronger warranty or negligence cases).
88

See Blankenship v. General Motors Corp., 406 S.E.2d 781,786 (W.Va. 1991).

89

See id.

o

Id.

See Vargo, supra note 68, at 529; see also Vandall, supra note 68, at 1409 (stating that the
Reporters statement that the reasonable alternative design requirement is supported by the majority of the
jurisdictions is not accurate).
91
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required could collect the benefits. This is the very result our court in Blankenship
sought to avoid by adopting a liberal crashworthiness doctrine."
2.

Risk-utility Analysis as the Exclusive Test to Determine "Defect"

Intertwined with the reasonable alternative design requirement is the
Reporter's insistence on a single risk-utility standard for a design defect and the deemphasis of other tests, particularly the consumer expectation test." Therefore,
under the new Restatement, a RAD is to be measured by a "risk-utility" test that
would include a broad range of factors including the cost of the RAD; the effects of
the RAD on longevity, maintenance, repair, and aesthetics; the magnitude and
probability of harm as the product was designed; the instructions and warnings
accompanying the product; the nature of the consumer expectations about the
product; and the overall safety of the product."' Again the Reporters claim that this
is the dominant standard to judge the defectiveness of product designs in the
majority ofjurisdictions. 5
While it is true that risk-utility is the standard in many jurisdictions, it is
important to distinguish between the general risk-utility test and the specific,
absolute requirement of the new Restatement's proof of an alternative design. The
problem does not lie with the general risk-utility test. Instead, the problem lies with
the Reporters' requirement that within the risk-utility analysis, plaintiffs must prove
an alternative design that would have eliminated or lessened the injury. Failure to
do so subjects a plaintiff s case to dismissal under the new Restatement.
Because the risk-utility model is the only one that will accommodate the
RAD requirement, the Restatement essentially eliminates the consumer
expectations test for defectiveness. The Reporters state "consumer expectations do
not constitute an independent standard for judging the defectiveness of product
designs."' This particular view is based on the Reporters insistence on a
reasonable alternative design." They say the consumer expectations "concept does
not take into account whether the proposed alternative design could be
92

See Blankenship, 406 S.E.2d at 786.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY §2, comment g at 27 (1997) (making
it clear that the test [for a RAD] is a "risk utility" test, never a "consumer expectations" test). This is not
true of food products where the consumer expectations test is retained to prove liability. See id at comment h
at 28.
93

94

See Wagner, supra note 82, at 1646.

95

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2, commentf at 22 (1997).
Id. at comment g at 27.

97

See id.
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implemented at reasonable cost,
or whether an alternative design would provide
98
greater overall product safety."
As Professor Shapo points out,
[t]his is a remarkable comment, for it refuses to admit of a
consumer who would, for any one of a number of reasons, expect
a certain level of safety from a product that it did not turn out to
provide. The consumer's image of the product, derived from
sources that include direct advertising and widespread social
agreement about the capabilities, of products in that general
category, does not necessarily comprehend the question of what
the potential alternative designs might be, or even if an alternative
design exists. That image centers on the good at issue - the
product that the consumer buys or chooses to encounter.99
Moreover, at least three articles challenge the Reporters' assertion that the
risk-utility test is the standard to determine design defect in a majority of
jurisdictions."0 One article declares that "[m]ore than half the cases [on which the
reporters rely] fail to provide anything but the most fanciful support [for their
interpretation]..... Another concludes that "a large majority of the cases which
have addressed this issue have held that a design defect is to be determined by the
consumer expectations test of section 402A."1 2 Therefore, there is strong evidence
that the risk-utility standard is not the dominant standard in a majority of
jurisdictions.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals considered adopting the
risk-utility analysis suggested by Cepeda v. CumberlandEngineering Co., Inc.1"3
The risk-utility analysis in Cepeda was originally proposed by Dean Keeton and
Dean Wade and consists of seven factors to weigh to determine if a product is
defective.' The MorningstarCourt recognized that the risk-utility standard has a
98

Id.

99

Shapo, supra note 86, at 16 (citation omitted).

100

See Roland F. Banks and Margaret O'Connor, Restatingthe Restatement (Second), Section 402A -

Design Defect, 72 OR. L. REv. 411 (1993); Howard F. Klemme, Comments to the Reporters and Selected
Members of the Consultative Group, Restatement of Torts (Third): ProductsLiability, 61 TENN. L. REv. 1173

(1994); John Vargo, supranote 68.
101

Klemme, supranote 100, at 1174-75.

102

Banks & O'Connor, supranote 100, at 415.

103

See Momingstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 666, 681 (W. Va. 1979); see also

Cepeda v. Cumberland Engineering Co., Inc., 386 A.2d 816, 826-27 (N.J. 1978).
104

See Page Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30, 37-38
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place in product liability but did not adopt it to define defect.' Instead the court
recognized risk-utility as necessary to an expert witness's analysis of a product."
Thus, the court recognizes that when an expert witness goes through his or her
methodology in determining if a product is defective, that expert naturally employs
a balancing test, utilizing risk-utility factors, before he testifies as to a product's
defectiveness." 7 However, according to Morningstar, risk-utility is not the method
the courts in West Virginia use to determine whether a product is defective.

8

Another variant from the rigid risk-utility standard of the Restatement
comes with the Fourth Circuit's utilization of the consumer expectation test.'0 9 The
West Virginia courts have not yet used a consumer expectation test in any of its
(1973); John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Liabilityfor Products,44 MiSs. L.J. 825, 834-35 (1973). The
seven factors to consider are as follows:
The usefulness and desirability of the product, its utility to the user and to the public as
a whole.
The safety aspects of the product, the likelihood that it will cause injury, and the
probable seriousness of the injury.
The availability of a substitute product that would meet the same need and not be as
unsafe.
The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product without
impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain its utility.
The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use of the product.
The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product and their
avoidability, because of the general public knowledge of the obvious condition of the
product, or of the existence of suitable warnings or instructions.
The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the loss by setting the price
of the product or carrying liability insurance.
Cepeda, 386 A.2d at 826-27.
10S
106

See Morningstar,253 S.E.2d at 682.
The MorningstarCourt stated that
a risk/utility analysis does have a place in a tort product liability case by setting the
general contours of relevant expert testimony concerning the defectiveness of the
product. In a product liability case, the expert witness is ordinarily the critical witness.
He serves to set the applicable manufacturing, design, labeling, and warning standards
based on his experience and expertise in a given product field. Through his testimony
the jury is able to evaluate the complex technical problems relating to product failure,
safety devices, design alternatives, the adequacy of warnings and labels, as they relate to
economic costs. In effect, the expert explains to the jury the risk/utility standards and
gives the jury reasons why the product does or does not meet such standards, which are
essentially standards of product safeness.

Id.
107

See id.

108

See id. at 683.

109

See Sexton v. Bell Helmets, Inc., 926 F.2d 331 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding that a product can only be

defective if it is imperfect when measured against a standard existing at the time of sale or against reasonable
consumer expectations held at the time of sale in a product liability action arising out of a dirt bike accident).
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product liability decisions. However, the Fourth Circuit has recognized this test as a
standard by which to measure product defectiveness on an appeal from a judgment
of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia."' Therefore,
based on precedent, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals might employ
this standard given the opportunity. Since the new Restatement removes this option,
the Restatement again restricts a plaintiff's ability to bring a strict liability cause of
action.
Based on the reasonable alternative design requirement and its rigid
insistence on a risk-utility analysis, the new Restatement is significantly
burdensome and somewhat restrictive to a plaintiff's product liability action. This
is problematic to the current law and policy on product liability in West Virginia.
However, the new Restatement is also problematic because evidence of a
reasonable alternative design (RAD) is all but impossible to admit under Daubert.
3.

Conflicts with Daubert

The RAD requirement of the new Restatement presents an additional
problem because expert witness testimony about the scientific validity of a
theoretical design might be practically impossible to admit under the Daubert
standard for scientific evidence." The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
first adopted the Daubert standard in analyzing the admissibility of expert
testimony, under Rule 702 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence, in Wilt v.
Buracker."2 Under the Daubertanalysis,
[t]he ...

initial inquiry must consider whether the testimony is

based on an assertion or inference derived from scientific
methodology. Moreover, the testimony must be relevant to a fact
at issue. Further assessment should then be made in regard to the
expert testimony's reliability by considering its underlying
scientific methodology and reasoning. This includes an
assessment of (a) whether the scientific theory and its conclusion
can be and have been tested; (b) whether the scientific theory has
been subjected to peer review and publication; (c) whether the
scientific theory's actual or potential rate or error is known; and
(d) whether the scientific theory is generally accepted within the
110

See id. at 337.

III

See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

See Wilt v. Buracker, 443 S.E.2d 196, 203 (,V. Va. 1993) (concluding that Daubert'sanalysis of
federal Rule 702 should be followed in analyzing the admissibility of expert testimony); see also Gentry v.
Magnum, 466 S.E.2d 171 (,V. Va. 1995); Mayhom v. Logan Medical Foundation, 454 S.E.2d 87 (W. Va.
1994).
112
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3
scientific community."

Wilt is notably significant because, in that case, the court recognized that
Rule 702 is not confined to scientific expert testimony but applies to scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge. "4 This very issue is currently before the
United States Supreme Court in Kumho Tire Company Ltd. v. Carmichael." ' The

Ten Circuit Courts that have addressed the issue are split five to five as to whether
Daubert applies to non-scientific expert testimony."' Thus, until the United States
113

Wilt, 443 S.E.2d at 203.

114

See id. at 203 n. 11.

115

Carmichael v. Samyang Tire, Inc., 131 F.3d 1433 (11 th Cir. 1997), cert. granted sub nom. Kumho

Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, __ U.S.__ 118 S. Ct. 2339 (1998). The Supreme Court granted Kumho
Tire's petition for a writ of certiorari to review whether the Daubert standard should apply to expert
engineering testimony.
116

The Circuits that have held that Daubert does not apply include the following:

Tenth Circuit: In Compton v. Subaru of America, Inc., 82 F.3d 1513, 1519 (1996), cert. denied,__ U.S. _..__,
117 S. Ct. 611 (1996), the court held it was inappropriate to apply a Daubert analysis to the testimony of an
aerospace and mechanical engineering expert. The court reasoned that the testimony was not based on any
particular methodology or technique, but on general engineering principles and the expert's 22 years
experience as an automotive engineer.
Fourth Circuit: Freeman v. Case Corp., 118 F.3d 1011, 1016 n.6 (1997), cert. denied, _ U.S._
118 S.
Ct. 739 (1998) (holding that a mechanical engineer's testimony about an alleged pedal defect in a lawn
mower was based on his experience and training and used no particular methodology to reach his
conclusions, therefore, application of Daubert was unwarranted).
Ninth Circuit: McKendall v. Crown Control Corp., 122 F.3d 803, 806 (1997) (holding that a district court
erred in applying the Daubert factors, which are "relevant only to testimony bearing on 'scientific'
knowledge," to a mechanical engineer's testimony).
Eleventh Circuit: Carmichael v. Samyang Tire, Inc., 131 F.3d 1433, 1435 (1997) (holding that Daubert
covers only the "scientific context" and does not apply to a mechanical engineer's testimony about the cause
of a tire failure).
Second circuit: Stagl v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 117 F.3d 76, 82 (1997) (holding it was error to exclude,
pursuant to Daubert, the testimony of a mechanical engineer that a baggage-delivery system was
unreasonably unsafe for older people).
The Circuits that have held that Daubert does apply include the following:
Sixth Circuit: Smelser v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co., 105 F.3d 299, 303-04, cert. denied, _ U.S. ____ 118 S.
Ct. 67 (1997) (holding that an Ohio trial court failed to adequately perform its "gatekeeping" function by
admitting the testimony of a biornechanical engineer who said a defective shoulder belt in a pickup truck
caused the driver to be injured in an auto accident).
Seventh Circuit: Cummins v. Lyle Industries, 93 F.3d 362, 370 (1996) (rejecting plaintiff's argument that
Daubert applies only to novel scientific testimony). The Seventh Circuit held that an engineering expert
regarding the feasibility of alternative designs and the adequacy of warnings and instructions properly applied
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Supreme Court rules on Kwnho Tire, in those jurisdictions where Daubert does not
apply to non-scientific evidence, RAD testimony is admissible. However, West
Virginia is not such a jurisdiction. West Virginia applies Daubert to non-scientific
evidence.11 Thus, the Daubert requirements apply to the admissibility of expert
testimony concerning a RAD. Therefore, in light of Daubertany RAD testimony is
inadmissible in our courts.
Expert testimony concerning a RAD is inadmissible under Daubertfor two
reasons. First there is no way to calculate a theory's error rate without testing the
alternative design. Furthermore, there is no way of testing the alternative design
short of building a prototype and studying it. This could prove very costly in certain
situations. The Reporters contend that building a prototype is not required to satisfy
the alternative design requirement."1 However, in light of Daubertand Wilt, this is
simply not true in West Virginia.
The second, and more significant, reason that expert testimony on a RAD
is inadmissible under Daubertis because the scientific theory behind the reasonable
alternative design would often be created specifically for litigation. Scientific
theories of this type are not admissible under Daubert 1119 because of several
concerns. These concerns include the bias of the researcher, expert shopping, and
that theories developed for litigation do not provide "objective proof that the
research comports with the dictates of good science.""12 Therefore, because the
the Daubertfactors to testimony. See id
Eighth Circuit: Peitzmeier v. Hennessy Industries, Inc., 97 F.3d 293, 297 (1996), cert. denied, _ U.S.
117 S. CL 155 (1997) (holding that a district court properly excluded the testimony of an expert who was to
testify that design changes in a tire changer would eliminate the potential for injuries and that the tire changer
was defective in design).
Fifth Circuit: Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc., 121 F.3d 984, 990 (1997) (following Peitzmeier and Cummins by
holding "that the Daubert analysis applies to the type of expert testimony presented by [plaintiffs' civil
engineering expert]").
Third Circuit: Surace v. Caterpillar, Inc., 11 F.3d 1039, 1055-56 (1997) (holding that it was not error for a
district court to exclude an electromechanical engineer's testimony pursuant to Daubert).
117

See Wilt v. Buracker, 443 S.E.2d 196,203 (W. Va. 1993).

118

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTORTS: PRODUcTs LIABILITY § 2, commentfat 24 (1997).

119

See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1995) [hereinafter

Daubert II] (stating that "in determining whether proposed expert testimony amounts to good science, we
may not ignore the fact that a scientist's normal workplace is the lab or'the field, not the courtroom or the
lawyer's office.").
120

Id. The fact that Daubert 11 does not allow scientific theory developed for litigation to be

admissible is consistent with the Daubert view that judges must perform a two-part, "gatekeeper" analysis
when analyzing evidence of this type. First, the court "must determine nothing less than whether the experts'
testimony reflects 'scientific knowledge,' whether their findings are 'derived by the scientific method,' and
whether their work product amounts to 'good science."' Id. at 1315. Second, "[the court] must ensure that
the proposed expert testimony is 'relevant to the task at hand,' i.e., that it logically advances a material aspect
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theories behind alternative designs will often be developed for litigation, they will
be inadmissible under Daubert II. In addition, since Daubert currently applies to
non-scientific theories in West Virginia, there will be no practical way to introduce
expert testimony concerning a RAD. If expert testimony concerning a RAD cannot
be introduced, then a plaintiff can never satisfy the Restatement's RAD
requirement in those instances necessitating an expert. Since a plaintiff cannot
satisfy the RAD requirement, a plaintiff cannot recover in West Virginia on an
otherwise valid product liability action."'
4.

Other Jurisdiction's Reactions to the New Restatement

To date, no court has adopted the Restatement Third, Torts: Products

Liability, however, courts can expect to be asked to do so in upcoming cases. In
fact, some courts have already been asked to adopt an alternative design
requirement. One such court is the Supreme Court of Connecticut in Potter v.
Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co." In Potter, the Supreme Court of Connecticut was

asked to require proof of an alternative design by the plaintiff to recover for
vibration-related injuries suffered from pneumatic hand tools.' In addition, the
court was asked to eliminate the consumer expectation test and adopt an exclusive
risk-utility test to determine a design defect.'24 The court rejected both of these
suggestions stating that case law does not support the change and that such a

of the proposing party's case." Id. (citation omitted). These views have been followed by the Fourth Circuit,
see Cavallo v. Star Enterprise, 892 F. Supp. 756, 760 (E.D. Va. 1995) and by the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals, see Gentry v. Mangum, 466 S.E.2d 171, 179 (W. Va. 1995).
121

The new Restatement does provide scenarios where proof of a reasonable alternative design is not

required to recover. For instance,
Section 3 provides that when circumstantial evidence supports the conclusion that a
defect was a contributing cause of the harm and that the defect existed at the time of
sale, it is unnecessary to identify the specific nature of the defect and meet the requisites
of § 2. Section 4 provides an alternative method of establishing defect. A plaintiff is not
required to establish the standard for design or warning under § 2, but merely to identify
a government-imposed standard. Comment e ... recognizes the possibility that product
sellers may be subject to liability even absent a reasonable alternative design when the
product design is manifestly unreasonable.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCT LIABILITY § 2, comment b at 17-18 (1997).
However, these represent a narrow class of products liability cases, and there is no exception to
the RAD requirement for the typical product liability action.
122

694 A.2d 1319 (Conn. 1997).

See id. at 1331. In urging the court to adopt an alternative design, the defendants pointed to the
second tentative draft of what is now the Restatement Third, Torts: Products Liability. See id.
123

124

See id. at 1334.
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change would impose an undue burden on plaintiffs.12
The Georgia Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in its decision in
Banks v. ICIAmericas, Inc."' In Banks, the court examined an alternative design
requirement and a risk-utility standard when parents of a nine year old child who
died after ingesting rat poison brought a product liability action against the poison
manufacturer. 27 The Banks Court held, based on its exhaustive review of foreign
jurisdictions and learned treatises, that design defect cases should be decided using
a risk-utility analysis where alternative designs may be considered, but are not
absolutely required, to prove a claim.'
V. CONCLUSION

West Virginia should refrain from adopting the Restatement of Torts,
Third: ProductsLiability as its standard for deciding product liability cases because
the Restatement presents concepts that are foreign to, and at odds with, the
established policy and precedent behind West Virginia's current law on product
liability. The new Restatement abolishes negligence and implied warranty as
separate bases for recovery, abolishes the consumer expectations test as an
independent basis for liability, relegates strict liability to a matter of mere
terminology, and forces a reasonable alternative design requirement into a mold
that does not accommodate it, particularly in light of Daubert and Wilt. 2" For a
state concerned with adopting liberal product liability policies to protect its
residential consumers, the new Restatement represents a fallacy. Indeed the
Restatement promotes the very problems that the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals has sought to avoid because the RAD requirement will likely deter
consumers from bringing otherwise valid products liability actions. Furthermore,
because of the Restatement's rigid insistence on a RAD requirement, a plaintiff is
practically precluded from bringing an otherwise valid product liability action
because there is no practical way to satisfy the RAD requirement under Daubert."'
See id. at 1331-32 (holding that an independent review of the prevailing common law reveals that
the majority of jurisdictions do not impose upon plaintiffs an absolute requirement to prove a feasible
alternative design). "[Furthermore,] [iln our view, the feasible alternative design requirement imposes an
undue burden on plaintiffs that might preclude otherwise valid claims from jury consideration." Id. at 1332.
125

126

450 S.E.2d 671 (Ga. 1994).
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See id. at 672.
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See id. at 674-75.
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See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCT LIABILITY § 2 (1997).
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The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has clearly and consistently
adopted rules and policies liberal to a plaintiffs recovery in its decisions on
31
product liability, so long as these policies were consistent with tort principles.'
The new Restatement asks the court to abandon this philosophy in favor of a
system that is more problematic and more restrictive to a plaintiffs recovery for
product liability actions. The Restatement asks West Virginia to abandon its long
history of decisions and policies on product liability law and adopt guidelines that,
arguably, do not even represent a majority view. West Virginia should not adopt
the new Restatement simply because it is not favorable to a plaintiffs recovery.
The overwhelming reason West Virginia should refrain from adopting this
Restatement is because of the policy behind the great body of law on product
liability.
It is unclear to this author why the Reporters seek such a radical change to
product liability law. 2 Product liability litigation represents only 1.7 percent of
civil cases in state general jurisdiction courts.' Nor is it an unreasonably high
number of plaintiffs verdicts, since plaintiffs win in less than half of all product
liability cases." Whatever the reasons for the Reporters insistence on a change, one
thing remains clear. That is, according to the manufacturers themselves, the current
products liability rules promote safer products by affecting the management
decision-making process. Managers say "products have become safer,
manufacturing procedures have been improved and labels and use instructions have
become more explicit." 131 In fact, the consumer Federation of America reports that
annually about 6,000 deaths and millions of injuries are prevented because of
product liability actions."
Thus, the overall effect of current laws on product liability is to prevent
131

See cases cited supra notes 1-2.
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One argument for this change is that the Reporters are heavily biased in favor of product liability

tort reform, and rather than promote progressive, pragmatic social reform (which is the stated purpose of the
ALl), this project was designed to achieve a kind of political balance between consumer and manufacturer
interests. See Just What You'd Expect: ProfessorHenderson'sRedesign of Products Liability, Ill HARV. L.
REv. 2366 (1988).
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See NATIONAL CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, 1996,25 (B.

Ostrom & N. Kauder, eds. 1997).
See STEPHEN DANIELS & JOANNE MARTIN, AMERICAN BAR FOUND., CIVIL JURIES AND THE
POLITICS OF REFORM 172 (1995); see also U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRODUCT LIABILITY:
VERDICTS AND CASE RESOLUTION IN FIVE STATES (1989).
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NATHAN WEBER, THE CONFERENCE BOARD, PRODUCT LIABILITY: THE CORPORATE RESPONSE 2

(1987).
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See HearingBefore the Subcomm. On Consumers of the Senate Comm. On Commerce, Science &

Transportation, 100"' Cong. 54 (Sept. 18, 1987) (testimony of Gene Kimmelman, Legislative Director,
Consumer Federation of America).
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injury by increasing the safety of products that reach the marketplace. Not only is
this the humane thing to do, but it also saves manufacturers money in the long run
because, by spending a little money up front to prevent injury, a manufacturer does
not have to make large compensation payments for injuries resulting from a
defective product. West Virginia's stance on product liability reinforces these ideas
and recognizes a manufacturer's ability to better absorb the costs of injuries. The
new Restatement undermines these concepts and, in those instances where a
plaintiff fails to prove a reasonable alternative design, causes the costs of injury to
be borne by society at large rather than by the manufacturer who produced the
dangerous product and is better able to absorb the loss. It is for this reason that
West Virginia should decline to adopt the new Restatement's position on product
liability law.
J. ZacharyZatezalo*

Special thanks to P, Dean Hartley for his editing comments and to Breigh Zatezalo for the use of
her computer.
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